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Abstract: 
Half a century ago Stein Rokkan claimed that the degree of party politicization of local politics differ among the 
center and the periphery: The further away from the center of the country a municipality is located, the less does the 
local party system at the council resemble that of the national parliament. Rokkan also claimed that the periphery 
would eventually catch up and that the difference between the center and the periphery would over time disappear. 
Using data on recent local elections in the three Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden and Denmark), we test if 
local party system nationalization is weeker in municipalities further away from the capital of the country; we find 
this is still the case in all three countries half a century after Rokkan’s writings on the subject. The lag-of-the-
periphery is not strong, but it is still there. 
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Half a century has passed since Norwegian social scientist Stein Rokkan published a number of 
articles and papers which dealt with the political differences between a country’s center and its 
periphery. These works became the foundation stones for his seminal contributions to the field of 
political geography (Rokkan & Valen, 1962; Rokkan, 1966).  
Rokkan here coined the term “politicization”, whereby he meant ‘[the] breakdown of the 
traditional systems of local rule through the entry of nationally organised parties into municipal 
elections’ (Rokkan, 1966: 244); this concept of “politicization”, or “party politicization” as it is 
also termed, has been used very often, when scholars have been analyzing political parties using 
some kind of spatial dimension (e.g., Webb 2000; Aars & Ringkjøb 2005; Gyford, 1985; Kjaer 
& Elklit, 2010a).  
Basically, Rokkan’s idea was to consider time as geography simultaneously, since his 
theory did not claim a constant difference between center and periphery, but primarily that there 
was a lag-of-the-periphery, because modernization starts in the political center only to spread to 
the periphery after some time. As Rokkan himself put it:  
 
“… we focus on differences in time-lags between local units and are particularly concerned to explore 
possible processes of spread from the central, highly commercialized and industrialized areas, to the 
peripheral, economically less developed areas. Our concern is not only with a process in time but also with 
a process in space” (Rokkan, 1970: 182).  
 
Consequently, Rokkan also prognosticated a kind of closure where the periphery would 
eventually catch up, eliminating the center/periphery differences (ultimately thereby also 
dissolving the dichotomy itself) and in his study of Norway he focused on 
 
“… the rapidly dwindling pockets of communities in the ‘prepolitical’ phase: the last of the communes to 
be brought under the sway of the national party system”, also claiming that “(w)e shall in fact be concerned 
with the end-phase in a continuous movement towards a ‘politicization’ of the total territory” (Rokkan, 
1970: 182-3). 
 
Another “geography variable” which for decades has attracted considerably scholarly interest is 
size; not, however, as the area of a political entity as such, but defined as the number of people 
inhabitating the political unit. Most famously this is seen in another seminal work, namely Size 
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and Democracy (Dahl and Tufte, 1973) where the authors also touch upon the party system 
dimension when they state in relation to the difference between municipalities that  
 
“[a]mong political units within a democratic country where a system of proportional representation obtains, 
the number of parties (or party lists) presented to the voters at election increases with unit size’ (Dahl & 
Tufte, 1973: 100).  
 
Newton takes this point a step further when he hypothesizes that  
 
“the larger and more urban the authority, the more likely it is to have not just a party system, but also a 
developed and competitive party system” (Newton, 1982: 201).  
 
By ‘developed’ Newton here implies the same presence (and dominance) by the nationwide 
parties as Rokkan describes as the result of party politicization.  
Even though Rokkan is mostly renowned for addressing the center/periphery dichotomy 
(as are Dahl and Tufte for the large/small distinction), Rokkan was by no means blind to the size 
dimension in his explanation of the development of party systems: “(the) effect of all these 
developments was to spread party politics further and further into the periphery and to intensify 
the efforts of mobilization even in local contexts” (1970: 192), but he also addresses the size-
dimension when he writes that: ”The process of politicization was almost immediate in the cities, 
but very gradual in the countryside” (1970: 191). Rokkan actually includes both dimensions 
when eventually stating that: “The last communes to be reached by this wave of politicization 
were generally small and sparsely populated units in the periphery” (1970: 193). 
So the simple theory of party politicization for which Stein Rokkan is so famous – the 
further away from the political center, the less is local politics dominated by the national political 
parties – is actually in his own writing more complex as he also include a dimension of size 
operationalized as population. What we want to do here is to disentangle these two dimensions 
and see if we can determine whether center/prephery or large/small is the significant dimension 
when spatial variations in party systems are to be explained.  
Rokkan was also recognized for his empirical work as he usually tried to support his 
theorization with empirical data, quite often from his native country of Norway. However, when 
it came to his theory on party politicization Rokkan fell a little short and could only contribute 
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with some very basic statistics. The reason was that he faced two shortcomings, one conceptual 
and one data-related. As for the conceptual, Rokkan recognized that “politicization … is a matter 
of degree and it must be of interest to establish a gradual index”. He also suggested a very rough 
index with five values combining “information on the number of party lists registered at local 
elections with data on the size of the vote for local lists without any explicit party affiliation” 
(Rokkan, 1970: 196).
1
 However, this index is too simple, limiting what kind of analysis it can be 
used for. We have, therefore, developed a more sophisticated index, the index of local party 
system nationalization, which specifically measures the two dimensions, Rokkan wanted to 
combine (Kjaer & Elklit, 2010a; 2010b). 
Rokkan suggested at least some partial solution as to how to measure the dependent 
variable (how party politicized the local party system is), but he more or less renounced in regard 
to a more sophisticated measure of his key independent variable (the center/periphery status). 
Attempting to measure the accessibility to polling stations in a municipality he “… sought to 
assemble data on the road networks and other transport facilities, but this proved technically very 
cumbersome” (Rokkan, 1970: 187). 
And when it came to the distance between the municipality and the political center – as 
Rokkan simply defined as the capital – he did not try to calculate that himself, but relied on a 
broader index of “peripherality” originally worked out to tap agricultural differences, but where 
“relative isolation in terms of the existing transport networks” are included as one criteria (along 
with other criteria such as income, tax rates, population turnover, and number of people working 
in the primary sector). Today, however, the simple distance between each of the municipalities 
and the capital is easily calculated, which means that one can have a much cleaner measure of 
this main independent variable.  
If Rokkan was right that the periphery would eventually catch up with the center, we 
might find ourselves in a situation where the phenomenon we are interested in – centre/periphery 
differences – have vanished.  However, Rokkan was not at all specific as to how fast he 
predicted the periphery to catch up with the centre, i.e. when the process of party politicization 
would have been completed, so we might still hope that our more sophisticated measures will 
                                                          
1
 The index values are: “No lists”, “One list, mostly non-political votes”, “One list, fewer non-political”, “Two or 
more, some non-political”, “Two or more, no non-political” (Rokkan, 1970: 195). 
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allow us to detect such differences, which will subsequently allow us to pronounce on how the 
process has gone in the countries we are studying. 
We will therefore in this article study if the process of party politicization has been 
completed and – if not – apply our index of local party system nationalization and the 
measurement of the municipalities’s distance to the capital to test Rokkans original hypothesis – 
the longer the distance to the center, the less party system nationalization – in order to see if it 
can still explain potential differences. We do so by looking at Stein Rokkan’s home turf: The 
three Scandinavian countries, i.e. Norway, Sweden, and Denmark.  
 
 
Measuring and Explaining Local Party System Nationalization  
 
According to Rokkan the “nationalization” of the local party system involves two more or less 
overlapping processes. The basic idea is that the national parties – or nationwide parties as we 
will refer to them to awoid any misunderstandings – first penetrate (Webb 2000: 30) the 
municipalities and their political realm. This will subsequently result in the local parties – or 
non-partisan lists as they are often denoted – being superseded and they will disappear from the 
local politics arenas they used to dominate. However, Rokkan points out that this is supposed to 
be a gradual process.  
Not only do the nationwide parties not target and invade all municipalities simultaneously 
(the basic idea is that they start at the center and move further and further outwards, into the 
periphery); the non-partisan lists might also not ‘surrender’ without a fight and there can be 
substantial pockets of resistance in some municipalities. So the nationwide parties might not 
attack all municipalities at the same time and pace and the non-partisan lists might put up a 
harder fight in some municipalities than in other. However, this also implies that a static measure 
of how nationalized a given local party system is (how far the process of party politicization has 
gone) at a specific point of time, has to take into account both dimensions: How far the 
nationwide parties have advanced and how much the non-partisan lists have pulled back. To give 
a precise and detailed description of the position one needs to include both dimensions. 
To combine the measurement of the advance of the nationwide parties and the remaining 
presence of the non-partisan lists we have developed “the index of local party system 
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nationalization” (Kjaer & Elklit, 2010a, 2010b). For the application of the index, see Kjaer and 
Elklit (2010a, 2010b) and Ennser-Jedenastik & Hansen (2013). This index measures for each 
municipality the degree to which the local party system resemble the national party system in the 
same country. The index comes in slightly different forms. Depending on the specific purpose: It 
can measure parties running or parties elected, and among parties elected it can measure the 
absolute number of parties or the effective number of parties (Kjaer & Elklit, 2010a). Here we 
use the index in the form, where it measures the degree of resemblance in terms of the absolute 
number of parties elected and for this variant of the index of local party system nationalization 
(LPSN) the formula is: 
 
      NPC × 100 
LPSN  =   
      NPP + LLC 
 
where NPC is the number of nationwide parties elected to the local council, NPP is the number of 
nationwide parties elected to the national parliament, and LLC is the number of local lists (non-
partisan lists) elected to the local council. The index runs from 0 to 100 and the higher value the 
more nationalized the local party system. If in a municipality in a country with six parties in the 
national parliament, five of these parties are elected to the municipal council together with one 
local (non-partisan) list, the index is simply calculated in this way: LPSN = (5×100)/(6+1) = 
71.4; if in another municipality only three of the national parties are elected together with two 
non-partisan list, the index will then be (3×100)/(6+2) = 37.5. Our claim is that the difference 
between the two values of the index reflect well the relative differences in the degree of local 
party system nationalization between the two imagined municipalities. 
To explain potential differences in the level of local party system nationalization across 
municipalities we include three different variables. Our main explanatory variable is the 
peripheral status of the municipality, the Rokkanian hypothesis stipulating that the farther away, 
the less party politicized. We will measure this by taking the driving distance from City Hall in 
the municipality to the National Parliament in the country. In most countries today this 
information is available online; if the addresses are entered into routeplanning sites, the distance 
will be returned. 
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We also include the population size of the municipality. The hypothesis is that larger 
municipalities will be more interesting to nationwide parties to conquer as they represent more 
voters which might be convinced to vote for the party locally and who might, therefore, also 
consider for the party at national elections. Larger municipalities can also be more attractive to 
the nationwide parties than smaller because it is easier to set up camp as more voters and 
therefore also potentially more supporters and a critical mass for forming an organization, i.e 
building a local branch of the nationwide party.  
  Eventually, we include as a control variable the number of seats in the municipal/local 
council. The hypothesis is that the larger the council, the easier it is – if the electoral system is 
one of proportional representation – even for the smaller nationwide parties to get represented at 
the councils since the natural threshold then gets lower (for a discussion of this, see Kjaer and 
Elklit, 2014).  However, it should be noticed that this could also be beneficial to the non-partisan 
lists which would then have the opposite effect on the degree to which the local party system is 
nationalized.      
 
 
Analysis 
 
Even though the hypothesis are straightforward, the dependent variable easily calculated, and 
only a few control variables are included, the empirical testing of whether there still is a lag-of-
the-periphery to be found when studying local party system nationalization can be difficult 
enough because of lack of accessible data. In many countries the official electoral statistics are 
not very detailed and often they do not include information on the party level. However, in the 
three Scandinavian countries, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, there is a long tradition for 
including local politics in the data which the national statistical bureaus gather and release after 
each local election.  
Consequently, we have both for Norway and for Sweden and Denmark unique datasets at 
our fingertips which allow us to test the hypothesis. We have compiled data from three recent 
elections, the 2011 local elections on Norway, the 2010 local elections in Swedenm and the 2009 
local elections in Denmark. And we have then calculated the index of local party system 
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nationalization for each of the 429 Norwegian, the 290 Swedish, and the 98 Danish 
municipalities. The results can be seen in Figures 1-3, respectively.  
 
*** Figure 1 goes here *** 
 
*** Figure 2 goes here *** 
 
*** Figure 3 goes here *** 
 
Just be looking at the maps we can see that the level of local party system nationalization is 
different in the three countries. The map for Sweden is darker than the one for Norway which is 
again darker than the Danish one which illustrates the differences in the level of local party 
system nationalization where the mean are 86.4, 71.5, and 63.4, respectively. So in Sweden we 
find a more nationalized local party system than in Norway, which is again more nationalized 
than Denmark.  
In this paper we are, however, more interested in the geographic differences. Simple 
eyeballing again gives the impression that distance to the center matters, at least it seems like the 
figures are a little brighter in the Norteastern part of Norway, in Northern Sweden and in 
Western Denmark, localities far from the three capitals, Oslo, Stockholm and Copenhagen, 
respectively. However, in Denmark one of the most nationalized local party systems are found in 
the middle of the map in the easternmost part of the peninsula of Jutland and this is the 
municipality of Aarhus which happens to be the second largest city in Denmark. This illustrates 
that is important not only to test the hypothesis about the peripheral status more systematically, 
but also to include control variables such as population size when doing this. 
Table 1 presents a model explaining the index of local party system nationalization by 
peripheral status, size of municipality and number of seats in local councils for each of the three 
countries (OLS regression).  
 
*** Table 1 goes here *** 
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The analyses in Table 1 shows first of all that in all three countries the periphery still lags behind 
when it comes to what Rokkan called party politicization. The further away from the political 
center, i.e., the capitals of Oslo, Stockholm, and Copenhagen, respectively, the less party 
politicisized is the local party system. And this is even so when municipal size and council size is 
controlled for. This pattern is found in all the countries, so even though this test of Rokkan’s 
hypothesis only is conducted half a century after it was first formulated, it can still be shown that 
dispite differences in geography and size, there are still remarkable reminisences from the lag-of-
the-periphery-pattern to be found in all three Scandinavian countries. 
Table 1 also shows that the effect of council size is as expected and this is again the case 
for all three countries. The more seats in the council, the more nationalized the party system – 
this was expected since the more seats the lower natural threshold and the better chances for 
minor parties, at least under proportional representation as we have in all three countries (see 
also Kjaer & Elklit, 2014). 
When it comes to population size, the findings are less clear and mostly not meeting the 
expectations. We hypothesized (as did Rokkan) that lower degree of party politicization should 
be found in smaller municipalities, but Table 1 demonstrates that this correlation is only found in 
Denmark (but where it is not statistical significant). In Norway and Sweden the relationship is 
significant, but in the opposite direction: In the larger municipalities the party system is less 
nationalized (when peripheral status and number of seats are controlled for). It might be that the 
major parties – not least the Labour party, but also the Conservatives – dominates these larger 
municipalities, making it  more difficult for the minor parties of the opposition to obtain 
representation in these Labour/Conservative strongholds.  
However, even though we find this statistical significant effect of peripheral status on the 
index of local party system nationalization across all three countries, it is not very substantial. 
When in Denmark the index decreases with a little more than two indexpoints when we move 
100 km away from Copenhagen, it means that in a municipality with five (of the eight) 
nationwide parties and one non-partisan list at the council, then – everything else being equal – 
this municipality would have had five nationwide parties and two non-partisan lists instead of 
one, if it had beens located 100 km further away from Copenhagen.  
It was clarified above that the index of local party system nationalization is comprised of 
two dimensions, namely the percentage of the nationwide parties, who are represented at the 
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council, and the percentage of the non-partisan parties/lists represented at the council. In Tables 
2 and 3 the same analysis with peripheral status, population size and number of council seats as 
explanatory variables has been conducted with percentage of nationwide parties represented and 
percentage of represented local/non-partisan parties as dependent variables to see if the effect of 
the distance from the center is more closely connected to one of the two dimensions than to the 
other . 
 
*** Table 2 goes here *** 
 
*** Table 3 goes here *** 
 
Tables 2 and 3 shows that the effect of the distance to the center is connected to both dimensions 
as the peripheral variable is negative correlated with the percentage of nationwide parties and 
positively correlated with the percentage of represented parties which are local lists (although 
this latter correlation is not significant in the Danish case). It is also so that the pattern for the 
presence of the nationwide parties is much more due to the included explanatory variables than is 
the case in regard to the presence of non-partisan lists: The models in Table 2 explain much more 
of the variation between the municipalities than the models in Table 3. 
 
 
Has the lag of the periphery decreased over time? A look at Denmark 1970-2009 
 
Even though we have demonstrated that the periphery has not (yet?) catched up, party 
politicization could still have been going on as a gradual process as Rokkan hypotesized. It is 
supposed to be a dynamic process and finding that at a given point of time the periphery has not 
fully catched up, does of course not mean that some process of party politicization has not been 
developing. We do not have data for all three countries over time, but for one of the countries, 
Denmark, we do have access to data going back to the 1966 elections, and therefore we will look 
at the Danish case in more detail.   
A feature which has been demonstrated to influence local party system nationalization is 
reforms amalgamating municipalities. The reason is that institutional change can be exploited by 
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the nationwide parties to spread even further (Kjaer & Elklit, 2010b). In the Danish case we 
actually have some data over time. We can thus compare the 2009 local elections to the last 
elections under the old municipal structure where Denmark had 275 municipalities. In Figure 4 
the index has been plotted on a map with 275 municipalities, and again from mere eye-balling it 
can be observed that party politization was lower in 2001 than in 2009 (Figure 4 is brighter than 
Figure 3). In 2001 the mean of the index was 51.9 compared to the 63.4 in 2009. A regression 
analysis similar to the one in Table 1 returns similar results for the 2001 data (index=25,154 – 
5,190***distance  -.465 pop. size + 2,304*** seats (N=275, R
2
=.36)). 
 
*** Figure 4 goes here *** 
 
Since we have data from each election since 1966 we can calculate the index mean for each of 
the elections for municipalities at the center, in the middle and in the periphery of Denmark, 
which is done in Figure 5.  
 
*** Figure 5 goes here *** 
 
Figure 5 shows that even though the periphery still lags behind, the difference has in Denmark 
been decreasing over the past 50 years.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The conclusions are that (1) that our index of local party system nationalization is well suited to 
study the degree to which national parties and the national party system have penetrated local 
politics in the Scandinavian countries, the very phenomenon Stein Rokkan was so concerned 
about in his seminal writings, (2) that the center/periphery divide in the Scandinavian local party 
systems is still there now, fifty years after Rokkan wrote about it, and (3) the differences between 
center and periphery in this regard is only disappearing slowly, even though the Danish 
experience show that institutional developments – by speeding up the processes – may contribute 
significantly to the changes. 
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 The party politicization that Rokkan forecasted half a century ago has been going on in 
the Scandinavian countries, but the process has not  yet come to an end and the nationwide 
political parties have not (yet) managed to dominate local politics entirely. In Denmark, two 
major amalgamation reforms (in 1970 and 2007) have led to an increase in the local party system 
nationalization over the past decades (Kjaer & Elklit, 2010b), whereas in Norway and Sweden 
evidence points to the non-partisan lists being more robust and even expanding their territory 
(see Aars and Ringkjøb 2005; and Erlingsson, 2008). As it is concluded elsewhere in regard to 
the Norwegian case: “Non-partisan alternatives remain a significant factor in local elections and 
in local councils. Rokkan’s fourth and final step of the nation-building process was thus never 
fully completed” (Aars & Ringkjøb, 2005: 177).  
 The long-lived non-partisan dimension of local politics is one thing, the reminisences of 
the lag-of-the-periphery in regard to the party politicization another – and, indeed, quite 
surprising. Even though it should be recalled that Rokkan did not set an expiration date for the 
traditional local party system in the periphery, it is surprising that we continue to find spatial 
differences half a century after Rokkan’s writings on the subject. But why is there still signs of a 
lag-of-the-periphery? 
Arguing along the two dimensions identified by Rokkan – and used as building blocks in 
our index of local party system nationalization – one can claim that the explanation should be 
found with the non-partisan lists as well as with the nationwide parties. Local non-partisan lists 
seem to be very long-lived (Reiser & Holtman, 2008; Brezovsek & Smerkolj, 2011; Gendzwill, 
2012) as there appears to be is a well-established demand for this non-partisanship and more so 
in the periphery where they have been a part of local politics for long. And the nationwide parties 
are still more present close to the center, which might be explained by the fact that the national 
party system is not that frozen; from time to time new parties are born and if they still tend to 
spread from the center and out, the lag-of-the-periphery will be kept alive, at least to some 
degree. Our analyses do not allow us to test this particular hypothesis, but as we have now seen 
that reminisences of the lag-of-the-periphery still exist, it might lead to research trying to explain 
these spatial differences.  
 
 
13 
 
References 
 
 
Aars, J. & Ringkjøb, H.-E. (2005). “Party Politicisation Reversed? Non-partisan Alternatives in 
Norwegian Local Politics”, Scandinavian Political Studies 28(2): 161-182. 
 
Brezovsek, M. & Smerkolj, L. (2011): “2010 Local Elections - A Serious Warning to 
Parliamentary Political Parties”. Lex Localis,  9: 2, pp. 145-162. 
 
Dahl, R.A. & Tufte, E.R. (1973). Size and Democracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Ennser-Jedenastik, L. & Hansen, M.E. (2013): ”The Contingent Nature of Local Party System 
Nationalisation: The Case of Austria 1985-2009”. Local Government Studies, 39:6, pp. 
777-791. 
 
Erlingsson, G.O. (2008): “The spatial diffusion of party entrepreneurs in Swedish local politics”. 
Political Geography, 27, 857-874. 
 
Gendzwill, A. (2012): “Independent Mayors and Local Lists in Large Polish Cities: Towards a 
Non-partisan Model of Local Government?”, Local Government Studies, 38:4, 501-518. 
  
Gyford, J. (1985). “The Politicization of Local Government”. In M. Loughlin, M.D. Gelfand & 
K. Young (eds.), Half a Century of Municipal Decline 1935-1985. London: Routledge. 
 
Kjaer, U. and J. Elklit (2010a). “Party politicization of local councils: cultural or institutional 
explanations for trends in Denmark, 1966-2005?”, European Journal of Political 
Research, 49:3, pp. 337-358. 
 
Kjaer, U. and J. Elklit (2010b). “Local Party Nationalisation: Does Municipal Size Matter?”, 
Local Government Studies, 36:3, pp. 425-444. 
 
Kjaer, U. and J. Elklit (2014). “The Impact of Assembly Size on Representativeness”, Journal of 
Legislative Studies, 20:2, pp. 156-173. 
 
Newton, K. (1982). “Is Small Really so Beautiful? Is Big Really so Ugly? Size, Effectiveness, 
and Democracy in Local Government”. Political Studies 30(2): 190-206. 
 
Reiser, M. & E. Holtmann (eds.) (2008): Farewell to the Party Model? Independent Local Lists 
in East and West European Countries. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 
 
Rokkan, S. & Valen, H. (1962). The Mobilization of the Periphery: Data on Turnout, Party 
Membership and Candidate Recruitment in Norway, Acta Sociologica 6, 111-158. 
 
Rokkan, S. (1966). Electoral Mobilization, Party Competition, and National Integration, in J. 
LaPalombara & M. Weiner (eds) Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
14 
 
Rokkan, S. (1970): Citizens, Elections, Parties. Approaches to the Comparative Study of the 
Processes of Development. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
 
Webb, P. (2000). The Modern British Party System. London: Sage. 
 
 
15 
 
Figure 1. The index of local party system nationalization for each of the 429 municipalities in 
Norway after the local elections of 2011. 
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Figure 2. The index of local party system nationalization for each of the 290 municipalities in 
Sweden after the local elections of 2010. 
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Figure 3. The index of local party system nationalization for each of the 98 municipalities in 
Denmark after the local elections of 2009. 
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Figure 4. The index of local party system nationalization for each of the 275 municipalities in 
Denmark after the local elections of 2001. 
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Figure 5: Index of local party system nationalization Denmark 1966-2009 split by geography. 
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Table 1: The index of local party system nationalization. Beta (S.E.). 
 
 Norway Sweden Denmark 
Periphery (distance to capital km/100) -.932   
(.202) 
*** 
-2.118 
(.296) 
*** 
-2.348 
(.808) 
** 
Population size (inhabitants/10,000) -1.584    
(.332) 
*** 
-.436 
(.140) 
** 
.321 
(.200) 
 
Council size (number of seats) 1.285 
(.124) 
*** 
.374 
(.074) 
*** 
.669 
(.208) 
** 
Constant 46.225 
(3.533) 
*** 
79.197 
(3.449) 
*** 
48.111 
(4.374) 
*** 
Adj. R
2
 .28 
429 
.23 
290 
.32 
98 N  
 
 
Table 2: Percentage of nationwide parties represented at the council. Beta (S.E.). 
 
 Norway Sweden Denmark 
Periphery (distance to capital km/100) -.611   
(.183) 
** 
-1.743 
(.258) 
*** 
-2.293 
(.668) 
** 
Population size (inhabitants/10000) -1.361    
(.302) 
*** 
-.536 
(.122) 
*** 
.172 
(.166) 
 
Council size (number of seats) 1.613 
(.113) 
*** 
.453 
(.065) 
*** 
.646 
(.172) 
*** 
Constant 41.109 
(3.210) 
*** 
80.423 
(3.009) 
*** 
53.432 
(3.616) 
*** 
Adj. R
2
 .40 
429 
.27 
290 
.33 
98 N  
 
 
Table 3: Percentage of the parties/lists represented at the councils which are local (non-
partisan) lists. Beta (S.E.). 
 
 Norway Sweden Denmark 
Periphery (distance to capital km/100) .695   
(.168) 
*** 
.837 
(.199) 
*** 
1.393 
(.910) 
 
Population size (inhabitants/10000) .805    
(.277) 
** 
-.025 
(.094) 
 
-.108 
(.226) 
 
Council size (number of seats) -.239 
(.103) 
* 
.017 
(.050) 
 
-.449 
(.234) 
 
Constant 12.949 
(2.946) 
*** 
3.223 
(2.315) 
 
18.864 
(4.927) 
*** 
Adj. R
2
 .06 
429 
.05 
290 
.09 
98 N  
 
